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Abstract
The paper reports on measurement and data treatment of  response latencies in computer
assisted surveys. Applying response latencies as a measure of mental processes, empirical
hypotheses are tested to explain the occurrence of response effects (here: acquiescence bias)
and the predictive power of generalized attitudes. Theoretically, it is assumed that behavioural
and other specific evaluative judgments in surveys are stronger influenced by acquiescence
bias and generalized attitudes when answering in a rather automatic-spontaneous response
mode, i.e. when response latencies are fast. Additionally, it is assumed that chronic attitude
accessibility acts as a moderator of acquiescence effects and predictive power of attitudes
within  spontaneous  mode  processing.  Empirical  tests  show  evidence  in  favour  of  these
assumptions, demonstrating the usefulness of response time measurement in surveys.
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Introduction
The empirical identification and theoretical explanation of response effects and the predictive
power  of  generalized  attitudes  on  behavioural  and  other  specific  evaluative  judgments  in
surveys still  is  a main topic of  survey research – both to reach a better  understanding of
respondents’ behaviour and to enhance the quality of surveys.
The  paper  shows  how  response  latency  measurement  can  be  used  to  detect  (1)  highly
predictive generalized attitudes on specific behavioural, social or individual judgments, and (2)
response effects like acquiescence bias in computer assisted surveys. Response latencies are
a rather coarse method to “looking into the minds” of respondents, i.e. to analyse on-going
cognitive processes while responding. In the subsequent  analyses, response latencies are
used as a proxy measure of spontaneous versus thoughtful responses. Theoretically, following
common  dual-process  theories,  two  response  modes  of  information  processing  are
distinguished: answering survey questions in an automatic-spontaneous mode in contrast to
answering in a deliberative-controlled mode. Methodologically, it is assumed that answering
survey questions in an automatic-spontaneous manner needs less time than answering in a
deliberative-controlled mode.  The paper  shows that  response latencies can be used as  a
proxy measure of response mode when applying several data treatment steps to transform
raw reaction times to response latencies.
In the following analyses, it is shown that the mode of information processing – i.e. response
latency measurement – acts as a moderator of the predictive power of attitudes as well as of
the occurrence of acquiescence effects (as a very frequent type of response effects).
The paper is structured in three main sections. Response latency measurement  introduces
how to apply response latency measurement in computer  assisted surveys and discusses
important data treatment steps. In the next section, the theoretical background of response
effects and predictive power of attitudes is discussed and a dual-process response model is
presented.  Several  hypotheses will  be derived,  explaining the strength  of  effects  of  social
attitudes and the occurrence of response effects (here: of acquiescence bias). In Empirical
analysis these hypotheses will be tested empirically by a split ballot experiment and structural
equation models. Finally, the last section gives several conclusions derived from the empirical
results.
Response latency measurement
Reaction  time  measurement  is  a  promising  method  to  gain  data  about  behavioural  and
cognitive processes of respondent’s behaviour in survey research. Since the end of the 19th
century, reaction time measurement has been a common method in (social) psychology to
operationalize latent mental processes (see Bassili, 2000; Faust, Balota, Spieler, & Ferraro,
1999).  “There simply isn’t  much else that can be measured.“  (Pachella, 1974, p. 43).  The
development  of  computer  assisted  survey  techniques  allows  measurement  of  response
latencies in CATI, CAPI, and CASI surveys. In the context of telephone surveys especially the
research results  of  Bassili  and Fletcher  have been very  important  for  the  development of
response  latency  measurement  in  even  large-scale  representative  CATI  surveys  (Bassili,
1993, 1995, 1996a, 1996b; Bassili & Fletcher, 1991). Several advantages are associated with
reaction time measurement:  it  can be implemented easily  and cost-effectively  in  computer
assisted surveys, the measure is unobtrusive and thus not consciously biased by respondents
and one gets the double amount of information about each answer (i.e. the substantial rating
of the respondent and the time the answer needed).
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In general, response latencies in surveys can be used as proxy variables for a wide range of
mental  processes.  Many  applications  use  response  latency  to  measure  the  mode  of
information processing respectively the degree of elaboration during the answering process
(e.g.  Baxter  &  Hinson,  2001;  Carlston  &  Skowronski,  1986;  Gibbons& Rammsayer,  1999;
Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000; Sheppard & Teasdale, 2000; Urban & Mayerl, 2007).[1]
In  this  context  it  is  assumed that  response  latency  becomes  slower  when  the  degree  of
elaboration increases. Using median split methods (e.g. Fazio, 1990b; Urban& Mayerl, 2007)
response  latency  can  also  be  used  as  a  proxy  of  the  two  typical  modes  of  information
processing. Thus, slow response latencies indicate activity of the deliberative-controlled mode,
and fast response latencies indicate automatic-spontaneous processing.
This interpretation of response latencies is empirically supported by results showing that an
inconsistent  information  basis  leads  to  slower  response latencies  (Bassili,  1996b;  Brömer,
1999;  Klauer  &  Musch,  1999).  Further,  response  latency  increases  with  the  amount  of
considered information (Bassili & Scott 1996; Houlihan et al., 1994).
To gain information about mental processes via response times, measuring and treating these
data accurately is essential for avoiding a biased interpretation of results of response time
analyses. Several steps are needed to gain accurate response latency data:
-          Step 1: Measurement of raw reaction times in computer assisted surveys: active by
interviewer or passive;
-          Step 2: Identification and treatment of invalid measures by outlier treatment (2.1) and
timer validation by interviewers (2.2);
-          Step 3: Controlling for individual baseline speed: Measurement of baseline speed and
statistical control by transformation of raw reaction times to response latencies;
-          Step 4 (optional): additional data treatment to gain normal distribution (e.g. taking the
logarithm,  reciprocal  transformation)  and/or  aggregation  of  latency  data  (e.g.  mean  of
latencies, median split etc.).
Applying step 1, reaction times can be measured with any computer assisted survey method.
In case of interviewer controlled surveys (CATI and CAPI), it is recommended to use active
measurement of the reaction times by a “four-screens-per-question-technique”: after having
read the question (screen 1), the interviewer immediately triggers the time measurement by
pressing a key and a blank screen appears in the CATI/CAPI software (screen 2). The time
screen 2 is visible corresponds to the response time measurement. As soon as the respondent
answers substantively, the interviewer stops the time measurement by pressing a key and
screen  3  appears,  where  the  interviewer  enters  the  given  answer  of  the  respondent.
Additionally, it is possible to ask the interviewers for timer validation (screen 4, see step 2).
This can easily be done for each question in a survey (see Mayerl & Urban, 2008). Passive
reaction times (also known as latent reaction times), on the other hand, measure the whole
process  of  a  question  in  a  survey,  including  reading  time  and  time  entering  the  answer.
Therefore, these times are more biased and inaccurate than active times. In web surveys and
other CASI systems without a present interviewer, passive times are the only way to measure
reaction times. Interestingly, several studies have shown that passive times lead to the same
substantial  results  in  comparison to  active  times (Mayerl  &  Urban,  2008;  Mulligan,  Grant,
Mockabee, & Monson, 2003). In each case reaction times should be measured in hundredth
seconds or milliseconds to get enough variance of the time data.
In  step 2,  invalid  reaction  times have to  be identified  to  gain  meaningful  time data.  Most
reaction time studies control for outliers. Usually, reaction times are defined as invalid when
they are out of the range of two standard deviations above or below the mean (this method is
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applied in the following analyses; several alternative thresholds are proposed and applied in
latency literature, see Mayerl & Urban, 2008, p. 59). This is reasonable because some times
are very long and it is very likely that these respondents have been distracted while answering
the survey. Additionally, interviewers can validate each response latency measurement. In our
study (see Data and sample for a description of the study design), we used three codes: (1)
valid measurement, (2) error by interviewer (e.g. triggered too late or too early, jumping across
the questions), (3) error by respondents (e.g. asked a question, used wrong response scale,
diversion, comments). Overall, 89% of all response latency measurements were coded valid
by the interviewers, in 2% of all latency measurements interviewers made errors and in 9% of
all cases respondents caused invalid response latency measurements. Invalid measurements
(in terms of outliers and interviewer-validation) were defined as missing values in the following
empirical  analysis  (see  Mayerl  &  Urban,  2008  and  Urban  &  Mayerl,  2007  for  detailed
information  of  data  treatment  used  in  this  study).  Alternatively,  common  missing  value
treatments can be applied in a further step (e.g. multiple imputation).
Having identified invalid reaction times, the statistical control of individual baseline speed is
elementary  for  the  analysis  of  response times (step 3).  Baseline  speed is  defined as the
general mental speed that a person needs to answer questions, independent of the content of
the question. Without the control of baseline speed, „[…], one is simply identifying a continuum
of generally fast versus slow responders.“ (Fazio, 1990b, p. 87). To control baseline speed,
several transformation indices have been proposed in literature, e.g. ratio index, difference
scores, z-scores, rate-amount index, and residual index (see Fazio, 1990b; Mayerl & Urban,
2008).  In the present study the so called “Residual  Index”,  proposed by Mayerl,  Sellke, &
Urban (2005), will be used as transformation index to control baseline speed differences. The
logic of the Residual Index is simple: the residuals of a linear regression of raw reaction times
on a baseline speed measure can be used as a response latency measure that is independent
of baseline speeds (more details see Mayerl et al., 2005).[2]
Ideally, baseline speed is operationalized by the mean of reaction times of questions which are
not  part  of  the  analyses (so  called  filler  latencies).  In  the following analysis,  the  mean of
reaction times of three simple factual questions were used as a measure of baseline speed:
confession, year of birth, and vegetarian (yes-no).[3][4]
Undoubtedly, response time measurement depends on a lot of additional biasing factors which
can  be  distinguished  into  characteristics  of  the  measurement  instrument,  the  interview
situation, and the respondents. The fourth source of response times is the ongoing mental
process during answering a survey – this is what researchers are typically interested in, from a
theoretical or substantial perspective (see Figure 1, for more details Mayerl & Urban, 2008, p.
32ff).  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  baseline  speed  measure  itself  depends  on  a  lot  of
methodological (e.g. interviewer speed) and individual (e.g. age) biasing factors – and this
means taking baseline speed into account implies controlling for a wide range of disturbing
factors (see Mayerl & Urban. 2008, p. 69f). This does not mean that other factors do not have
to  be  controlled  in  general,  but  that  controlling  for  baseline  speed  is  an  essential  and
necessary step for the treatment of response time measures and their proper interpretation as
a proxy measurement of mental processes.
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Figure 1: Determinants of response time
The  last  step  of  data  treatment  (step  4)  is  optional  and  depends  on  types  of  statistical
procedures which are intended to be used. Response times usually are positively skewed due
to some very long times. This skewness is reduced by outlier treatment, but in most cases
reaction  times  still  are  not  normally  distributed.  Thus,  if  normal  distribution  is  necessary,
reaction  times  can  be  transformed  by  taking  the  logarithm  (alternatively  by  reciprocal
transformation or by taking the square root). Also, reaction times sometimes are aggregated
by taking the mean of several time measures. Additionally, aggregation of response times can
be achieved by recoding (e.g. to use response time as grouping variable in a extreme group
comparison) via median split, tertile split, quartile split etc. (see Fazio, 1990b).
Looking at all  these possibilities of operationalization and data treatment, it  is obvious that
comparing results of response latency studies with different data treatments can be seriously
biased. When results are inconsistent, influence of data treatment has to be inspected.
In the following sections it is shown how response latencies can be used as a proxy measure
of  mode  of  information  processing  in  the  context  of  dual-process  models  to  analyse  the
predictive power of attitudes and the occurrence of response effects (here: acquiescence bias)
in surveys.
Theoretical background
Dual-process model of response behaviour
In  social  psychology it  is  very popular  to model  cognitive processes as the duality  of  two
different  cognitive  systems  or  modes  of  information  processing,  assuming  an  automatic,
spontaneous  and  non-conscious  mode  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  deliberative,  controlled,
conscious and intention-based mode on the other hand.
Most common dual-process models share these basic assumptions. Besides this fundamental
distinction  of  two  modes  of  information  processing,  a  lot  of  dual-process  models  were
proposed in literature, each with different terms and some compatible and some incompatible
additional  assumptions.  Some  of  the  most  popular  dual-process  models  are  Heuristic-
Systematic Model (Chaiken, 1980), Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986),
MODE-model (Fazio, 1990a), satisficing vs. optimizing in survey context (Krosnick, 1991), and
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Reflective-Impulsive Model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Incompatibilities of these models will not
be discussed in this paper (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Keller, Bohner, & Erb, 2000; Smith &
DeCoster, 2000). Instead, a generic dual mode model of attitude-behavior-research (with focus
on response behavior in surveys) will be used based on five assumptions which are shared by
most of these dual-process theories:
Assumption 1: A qualitative distinction is made between two modes of information processing:
unconscious  automatic-spontaneous  vs.  conscious  deliberative-controlled.  Automatic-
spontaneous  processes  can  be  characterized  as  top-down,  using  simple  heuristics  (e.g.
response sets  like acquiescence in  surveys),  situative or  contextual  cues (e.g.  interviewer
characteristics, question order) or overall evaluations of objects (i.e. generalized attitudes) to
answer  survey  questions.  In  contrast,  deliberative-controlled  processes  are  bottom-up
processes, generating a judgement upon the retrieval of “raw data“ (e.g. beliefs).
Assumption 2:  The elaboration continuum is the quantitative dimension underlying the two
modes:  conscious  deliberative-controlled  mode  as  the  pole  of  high  elaboration  and
unconscious automatic-spontaneous mode as the pole of low elaboration.
Assumption  3:  Motivation  and  opportunity  are  necessary  and  sufficient  predictors  of  the
appearance of  the modes:  the higher  both,  the motivation and  the opportunity  to  process
information in a deliberative way, the higher the degree of elabaration and thus the probability
of the usage of the deliberative-controlled mode. Thus, the lower motivation and/or opportunity,
the higher is the probability of the activation of the automatic-spontaneous default mode.[5]
Assumption  4:  According  to  the  MODE model,  the  chronic  accessibility  of  an  attitude  is
assumed to be relevant only in the case of spontaneous processing (Fazio, 1990a, p. 93f, 104;
Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldson, 2005, p. 58).[6][7] Thus, chronic attitude accessibility is assumed to
be a moderator of the attitude-response-process (i.e. that the “real“ attitude is given by the
respondent) only in the case of spontaneous mode. In respect to response effects, this means
that chronic attitude accessibility is a moderator of the influence of response effects within the
spontaneous mode: the higher the chronic accessibility, the lower the influence of response
effects.
Assumption 5: A lot of dual-process theories assume that it is possible that the two modes may
co-occur.  In  this  paper,  the  assumption  of  co-occurrence  is  combined  with  the  trade-off
assumption of the Elaboration Likelihood model, stating that the two modes do not influence
cognitive processes independently of each other. Instead, it is assumed that the influence of
the spontaneous mode decreases and the influence of the deliberative mode increases with an
increasing degree of elaboration.
In sum, on the basis of this dual-process model, at least three types of response behavior can
be distinguished theoretically.  To simplify  the model,  as done in  Figure 2,  elaboration and
chronic  accessibility  will  be  reduced  to  a  binary  scaling  level  to  identify  typical  forms of
response behavior:
(1a) attitude-based automatic-spontaneous responding;
(1b) cue-/heuristic-based automatic-spontaneous responding;
(2) deliberative-controlled responding.
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Figure 2: Dual-process model of response behavior
As reported,  three  conditions  can  be  used  to  differentiate  these  three  types  of  response
behavior: motivation, opportunity, and chronic attitude accessibility. Response type (2) occurs
under the condition of high motivation and high opportunity. Type (1a) occurs in the case of low
motivation and/or low opportunity and high  chronic attitude accessibility.  Thus, type (1b) is
expected to  appear  in  the  case of  low motivation  and/or  low opportunity  and low  chronic
attitude accessibility.
In the subsequent empirical analysis, response latencies will be used as proxy measure of
mode of information processing, thus allowing to adopt this dual-process model of response
behavior.
Types of response effects
In  survey  research,  response  effects  are  commonly  defined  as  influences  on  response
behavior  which  prevent  that  a  “true”  answer/value  is  given  by  the  respondent.  These
influences  may  come  from  the  measurement  instrument  (e.g.  question  order,  question
wording), interview situation (e.g. sponsorship effects, social desirability) or individual factors of
the  respondents  (e.g.  individual  tendency  to  acquiescence,  usage  of  response-sets).  In
general, two main types of response effects can be distinguished: Firstly, response effects may
be issue-related, i.e. the use of temporarily accessible information related to the question issue
(e.g.  question  order,  social  desirability,  wording,  sponsorship  effect).  Secondly,  response
effects  may  also  be  issue-unrelated,  i.e.  the  use  of  response-sets  and  simple  decision
heuristics (e.g. acquiescence, tendency to middle category).
In this paper, it is argued that the occurrence of response effects mainly depends on how much
mental  effort  is  needed  to  apply  such  response  effects.  Acquiescence  and  other  simple
decision  heuristics  can  be  applied  rather  automatic-spontaneously  (e.g.  simple  agreeing
independent of question content). Especially the tendency to agree, i.e. acquiescence bias, is
an easy applicable and well-learned conversational social norm that fits to a lot of situations –
just because of the fact that agreement usually needs less or no explanation in contrast to
disagreement. This is also true for other response effects without demand of high cognitive
efforts,  e.g.  assimilation  (carryover)  effects  of  question  order.  On  the  other  hand,  some
response effects lead to high mental efforts and thoughtful processes, e.g. contrast (backfire)
effects of question order, which need subtraction or comparison of contents (Strack & Martin,
1987;  Sudman,  Bradburn,  &  Schwarz,  1996;  Tourangeau  &  Rasinski,  1988;  Tourangeau,
1992). Also, wording problems of questions may lead to high mental efforts of respondents
trying to understand what is asked, or trying to fit the answering categories to the question.
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In literature, a wide range of predictor variables have been identified. For example, causes of
the occurrence of issue-unrelated response effects can be: lack of motivation to think about the
issue, lack of time to think about the issue, lack of any knowledge about the issue, lack of
interest  on the issue or – more general  – the survey at  all,  and a personal  psychological
tendency to generally agree, disagree or abstain (e.g. Knowles & Condon, 1999; Tourangeau
& Rasinski, 1988).
Response effects may also rely on situative cues. In this case, it  depends on the specific
situation, whether it is issue-related (e.g. social desirability initiated by characteristics of the
interviewer or the sponsor of the study) or issue-unrelated (e.g. effects of the actual mood of
the respondent).
Combining the shown theoretical dual-process model (Figure 2) with these response effect
explanations, it is obvious that some response effects are expected to appear in automatic-
spontaneous response mode and others in deliberative-controlled mode. Additionally, in case
of automatic-spontaneous mode, these response effects are expected to appear only when
there  is  no  chronic  attitude  accessible  –  thus  leading  to  a  cue-/heuristic-based  response
behaviour (response type 1b in Figure 2). These assumptions will be tested empirically in the
subsequent sections for the case of acquiescence bias.
Hypotheses
The  following  hypotheses  can  be  concluded  out  of  the  presented  dual-process  model  of
response  behaviour  and  will  be  tested  empirically  in  the  next  section.  The  corresponding
research question is whether it is possible to use response latencies to predict (a) strong vs.
weak effects of generalized attitudes towards targets on  specific judgments in surveys (e.g. on
specific  personal  characteristics  or  individual  behaviour),  and  (b)  the  occurrence  of
acquiescence bias in surveys as a special type of response effect.
H1.1:     If respondents answer in the automatic-spontaneous mode of information processing,
acquiescence effects are more likely to appear in comparison to deliberative-controlled mode
processing.
H1.2:     If respondents answer in the automatic-spontaneous mode of information processing,
generalized attitudes are more predictive towards specific judgments in surveys (e.g. towards
judgments about specific behaviour) in comparison to deliberative-controlled mode processing.
H1.3:     If respondents answer in the deliberative-controlled mode of information processing,
raw data  of  decision  making  (“beliefs”)  are  more  predictive  towards  specific  judgments  in
surveys  (e.g.  towards  judgments  about  specific  behaviour)  in  comparison  to  automatic-
spontaneous mode processing.
H2.1:     If respondents answer in an automatic-spontaneous mode of information processing
and  chronic attitude accessibility  is  low,  acquiescence  effects are more likely to appear in
comparison to (a) automatic-spontaneous processes with high attitude accessibility and (b)
deliberative-controlled information processing.
H2.2:     If respondents answer in an automatic-spontaneous mode of information processing
and  chronic attitude accessibility is high,  generalized  attitudes  are more predictive towards
specific judgments in surveys (e.g. towards judgments about specific behaviour) in comparison
to (a) automatic-spontaneous processes with low attitude accessibility and (b) deliberative-
controlled information processing.
Hypotheses H1.1, H1.2 and H1.3 refer to the distinction between two modes of information
processing (spontaneous vs. deliberative). Hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 assume that the mode
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information processing acts as a moderator of effects of attitudes and response sets (here:
acquiescence), where stronger effects are expected in spontaneous mode. According to H1.3,
in deliberative response mode behavioural judgments should base on a broader basis of “raw
data” about evaluations and expectations on possible outcomes.
Hypotheses H2.1  and H2.2  are assumptions on the role of  attitude accessibility  within the
modes  of  information  processing  as  shown in  Figure  2,  expecting  spontaneous  response
effects and stronger effects of generalized attitudes to occur under special conditions only:
generalized  attitudes  towards  targets  are  assumed  to  guide  specific  judgments  (e.g.
behavioural judgments) strongest under the condition of ‘automatic mode and high attitude
accessibility’, and acquiescence bias is assumed to occur under the condition of ‘automatic
mode and low attitude accessibility’.
These hypotheses will be tested by the experimental variation of question wording in a split
ballot design and by the estimation of structural equation models.
Empirical analysis
Data and sample
The data used for this analysis has been conducted in the DFG-founded project “Response
latency  measurement  in  survey  research.  Analysing  the  cognitive  basis  of  attitudes  and
information  processing”,  carried  out  by  the  institute  for  social  sciences  at  University  of
Stuttgart.  The  survey  was  conducted  as  a  German  nation-wide  random  sample
CATI-survey[8]   from  2nd  February  2005  to  1st  April  2005  with  2002  respondents.[9]
Additionally, the study was designed experimentally with eight different questionnaire versions
(regarding differences in question order and item wording). Reaction times were measured
actively by interviewers during the process of interviewing for all items (in hundredth seconds).
In  the  following  analyses,  reaction  times  were  controlled  for  individual  baseline  speed  by
transformation  to  response  latencies  with  residual  index  (see  Response  latency
measurement).  All  latencies  are  controlled  for  outliers  (cut  at  ±2  standard  deviations
above/below the mean) and timer validation by interviewers.
Subsequent empirical analyses will be done in two different ways: (1) a split ballot experiment
will  be  used  to  examine  acquiescence  effects  on  aggregate  level  analysing  judgments  in
survey  towards  individual  psychological  characteristics  (Analysis  on  aggregate  level);  (2)
structural equation models on individual level will be estimated to test hypotheses about effects
of individual tendency to acquiescence, effects of generalized attitudes, and effects of beliefs
predicting specific behavioural judgments (Analysis on individual level).
Analysis on aggregate level
In a split ballot experiment with two groups within our CATI study (Ni= 250 each), the wording
of three items (5-point rating scale) of a psychological scale to measure need for cognition was
varied in an original wording (condition A) and an opposite wording (condition B). In this sense,
an  acquiescence  effect  is  expected  in  the  way  that  respondents  generally  tend  to  agree
independently of the content of the item (i.e. the direction of item wording). Therefore, it  is
assumed that a negative worded item (“not”,  “none”, etc.)  leads to a higher percentage of
agreement in comparison to disagreement to the contrary mirror (i.e. positive worded) item. In
the case of  items 1 and 2 (see Table 1),  the assumption is  that  the negation “not”  of  an
otherwise identical expression is the exact contrary of the original meaning in terms of logical
sense.[10] In case of item 3, it is more questionable whether the negated item may be the
exact opposite (the negation “less” instead of “not” is used). Thus, results of item 3 should not
be over-interpreted in case when no acquiescence effects should appear for the other two
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items.
For reasons of  a  better  presentation in  the Table 1  and 2,  the 5-point  rating scales were
recoded into 3-point scales (1-2=agreement, 3=undecided and 4-5=disagreement). In the next
step, the negative formulated items (condition B) were recoded so that “agreement” always
means that there is an agreement towards the original wording.
Table 1: Acquiescence bias for three items of a need for cognition scale
 A: “original“
(in %)
B: “negative”
(recoded)
(in %)
difference
(in %)
Item1)
original: I like abstract thinking.
negative: I do not like abstract thinking.
1-2 agreement 48.4 40.7 7.7
3 undecided 24.0 20.7 3.3
4-5 disagreement 27.6 38.6 -11
∑100
N=246
∑100
N=246
=6.7, df=2, p=0.035, N=492
Item2)
original: I like to think for hours about something.
negative: I do not like hours of thinking about something.
1-2 agreement 47.6 46.8 1.2
3 undecided 26.8 24 2.8
4-5 disagreement 25.6 29.2 -3.6
∑100
N=250
∑100
N=250
=0.88, df=2, p=0.608, N=500
Item3)
original: I think it is exciting to learn new ways of thinking.
negative: I think it is less exciting to learn new ways of thinking.
1-2 agreement 63.5 55.8 7.7
3 undecided 27.7 18.1 9.6
4-5 disagreement 8.8 26.1 -17.3
∑100
N=249
∑100
N=249
=27.52, df=2, p=0.000, N=498
In Table 1, in two out of three cases (item 1 and item 3) the expected acquiescence effect is
statistically significant (p ≤ 0.05). This means, the difference for both items between the two
wording groups is 7.7% more agreement to the original wording compared to disagreement to
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the negative worded items.  This is  also true for  disagreement to the original  wording and
agreement to the negative wording: in this case, the difference is 11% respective 17.3%.
To test hypothesis 1.1, assuming that acquiescence biases should appear in the spontaneous
mode and not in the deliberative mode, response latencies (median split at each item) will be
used  as  a  measure  of  the  mode  of  information  processing.  To  test  the  hypothesis,  an
interaction model via ANOVA will be tested using the original 5-point rating scales to reach
metric scales. Table 2 reports the results of this analysis.
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Table 2: Mode of information processing and acquiescence effect
automatic-spontaneous mode
(response latency ≤ median)
deliberative-controlled mode
(response latency > median)
modera-
tor effect
of
response
mode
(%)
A:
“original”
(in %)
B:
“negative”
(recoded)
(in %)
differ-
ence
(in %)
A:
“original“
(in %)
B:
“negative”
(recoded)
(in %)
differ-
ence
(in %)
Item1)
original: I like abstract thinking.
negative: I do not like abstract thinking.
1-2
agreement
59.8 31.4 28.4 30.2 46.8 -16.6 45
3 undecided 17.4 25.6 -8.2 33.3 19.4 13.9 22.1
4-5
disagreement
22.7 43.0 -20.3 36.5 33.9 2.6 22.9
ANOVA: Condition (“C“; 1: A; 0: B): p=0.470; Response latency (“RL“; 1: fast, 0: slow):
p=0.243;
Interaction CHRL: p=0.000; N=438
F=5.940; df=3; p=0.001
Item2)
original: I like to think for hours about something.
negative: I do not like hours of thinking about something.
1-2
agreement
56.4 42.5 13.9 34.0 48.8 -14.8 28.7
3 undecided 18.8 28.7 -9.9 39.2 22.0 17.2 27.1
4-5
disagreement
24.8 28.7 -3.9 26.8 29.3 -2.5 1.4
ANOVA: C: p=0.553; RL: p=0.268; CHRL: p=0.041; N=440
F=1.874; df=3; p=0.133
Item3)
original: I think it is exciting to learn new ways of thinking.
negative: I think it is less exciting to learn new ways of thinking.
1-2
agreement
70.4 57.9 15.8 48.3 51.9 -4.8 20.6
3 undecided 23.2 14.5 7.0 37.9 18.6 20.7 13.7
4-5
disagreement
6.3 27.6 -22.3 12.6 29.5 -15.9 6.4
ANOVA: C: p=0.203; RL: p=0.000; CHRL: p=0.088; N=433
F=7.495; df=3; p=0.000
In  all  three cases,  the  mode of  information processing acts  as  a  significant  moderator  of
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acquiescence bias. In the cases of items 1 and 2, the interaction effects are significant with p ≤
0.01 (item 1) respectively p ≤ 0.05 (item 2) (it should be taken into account that the overall fit of
the model of item 2 is fairly poor). In the case of item 3, the interaction effect is marginally
significant with p ≤ 0.10 and response latency acts as a significant main predictor, too (fast
respondents agree significantly more than slow respondents). Additionally, in all three cases,
the  main  effect  of  the  questionnaire  version  becomes  non-significant.  The  fact  that  the
interaction effect is only marginal significant in case of item 3 may be explained due to the less
straightforward exact negation of the meaning of the negative item. But the overall result stays
stable (or is even more consistent) when looking at items 1 and 2 only. Substantively speaking,
strongest agreement appears when two conditions are given: short latencies (i.e. spontaneous
processing mode) and a wording without negation. Interestingly, in case of item 2, it can be
shown  that  a  substantive  response  effect  appears  only  when  response  latencies  are
implemented into the analysis (Table 1 versus Table 2). Thus, response latency measurement
helps  to  identify  acquiescence  bias  on  aggregate  level  and  acts  as  a  moderator  of  this
response effect. In sum, the result presented in Table 2 supports hypothesis H1.1.
Interestingly,  results  of  Table  2  show  evidence  that  respondents  do  not  only  tend  to
acquiescence in case of spontaneous responding, but in addition there seems to appear a
contrary effect  in  case of  deliberative responses:  when response latencies are slow, more
people (relatively speaking) disagree to the negative item in comparison to agreement to the
positive item. This pattern appears for all three items. Thus, when respondent’s answer slowly
in a deliberative manner, they are more “skeptical” than fast responders, and this seems to be
forced by negative item wording. This finding is in line with literature showing that people with
negative mood need more time to answer to survey questions (Fazio, 1995; Ruder, 2001).
Analysis on individual level
Another  way of  analysing acquiescence effects  is  to  use a construct  of  general  individual
tendency towards acquiescence. To test the hypothesis whether such acquiescence effects
occur in  spontaneous mode (H1.1),  and whether generalized attitudes towards targets are
more predictive in spontaneous mode (H1.2) and beliefs are more predictive in deliberative
mode (H1.3), a multiple group structural equation model of spontaneous versus deliberative
responders in the domain of money donation towards welfare organizations will be reported.
In addition, a more complex model will be tested by differentiating two mode groups and two
chronic attitude accessibility groups, testing the dual-process model presented in Figure 2 in a
more detailed way. This allows analysing whether acquiescence bias occurs in a special case
of spontaneous processing, i.e. under the condition of low chronic attitude accessibility (H2.1),
and whether attitudes show strongest effects in case of spontaneous mode and high attitude
accessibility (H2.2).
For  these structural  equation analyses,  the same CATI data (see Data and sample)  were
used.[11] In the following model, a part of the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen & Fishbein,
1980)  will  be  applied:  the  explanation  of  an  attitude  towards  donating  money  to  welfare
organizations (two indicators; 5-point rating scales with 1: agree to 5: disagree)[12]. According
to Ajzen & Fishbein (1980, p.  84),  specific  attitudes towards behaviour  are determined by
several predictor variables. Firstly, the main predictors are behavioural beliefs, modelled in the
tradition of  expectancy-value models,  thus assuming that it  is  the product  of  evaluation of
outcomes  times  expectancy  that  behaviour  leads  to  outcome  which  guides  behavioural
perceptions. According to dual process model of response behaviour (Figure 2), these rational
outcome beliefs can be seen as “raw data”. Therefore, more beliefs should show significant
effects  in  case  of  deliberative-controlled  mode  of  information  processing  in  contrast  to
automatic-spontaneous mode (H1.3). Secondly, background variables may influence specific
attitudes  towards  behaviour.  One  class  of  background  variables  are  generalized  attitudes
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towards targets (see Ajzen & Fishbein 1980, p. 84). In attitude research, it is a central issue
under  which  conditions  generalized  attitudes  towards  targets  guide  evaluative  information
processing and thus other social  and behavioural judgments like specific attitudes towards
behaviour.[13]  Finally,  individual  tendency  to  use  response  styles  in  surveys  (here:
acquiescence) is another background variable which may influence behavioural judgments.
According to our dual  mode model,  generalized attitudes towards targets and tendency to
acquiescence  are  assumed  to  show  stronger  effects  in  case  of  automatic-spontaneous
response mode (H1.1 and H1.2). In addition, in an expanded model it is assumed that attitude
accessibility  moderates  effects  of  attitudes  towards  targets  and  acquiescence  in  case of
automatic-spontaneous response mode (H2.1  and H2.2).  In sum, the explanation model of
specific attitudes towards behaviour (here: donating money to charity) integrates the following
groups of predictors:
(a)      generalized attitude towards the target (i.e. development aid and charity organizations)
(two indicators; 5-point rating scale with 1: agree to 5: disagree)[14];
(b)      four  modal  salient  behavioural  beliefs  that  were carried out  in  a preliminary study
(N=120)  (interaction  term  of  evaluation  (5-point  rating  scale)  and  probability  (percentage
rating),  thus reaching a scale of  values from 0 to 500 for each behavioural  belief;  due to
scaling, negative effects are expected on attitude towards behaviour)[15];
(c)      an operative scale of tendency to agree (“acquiescence”) that was measured as the
sum of answering with “1” (“totally agree”) to exact one hundred 5-point rating scales on a wide
variety of contents that were conducted during the whole interview (reaching a scale of values
from  0  to  100;  again,  due  to  scaling,  negative  effects  are  expected  on  attitude  towards
behaviour).[16]  Thus,  in  contrast  to  the  foregoing  analysis,  acquiescence  is  an  individual
measure now;
(d)     a measure of altruistic motivation (one item; 5-point rating scale with 1: agree to 5:
disagree) as control variable.[17]
The mode of information processing is measured by median split of the mean of the response
latencies of both indicators of the behavioural attitude construct. Chronic attitude accessibility
of  the  attitude  towards  the  target  (i.e.  towards  charity  organizations)  is  measured  by
membership  in  a  charity  organization,  assuming  that  members  do  have  a  higher  direct
experience with that attitude object (membership yes: high attitude accessibility; membership
no: low attitude accessibility). Thus, membership (as an indirect measure of direct experience)
is  a  formative  indicator  of  chronic  attitude accessibility  (Fazio,  1986,  1990a;  Fazio,  Chen,
McDonel, & Sherman, 1982).[18]
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Figure 3: SEM model explaining responses to behavioral attitude questions
The model shown in Figure 3 will be estimated in a multiple group structural equation model. In
both  groups  (automatic-spontaneous  mode  versus  deliberative-controlled  mode),  all  factor
loadings  are  highly  significant  and  show standardized  values above 0.5.[19]  Both  attitude
measurement constructs were successfully externally validated.[20] Additionally, as common in
multiple  group  analysis  in  SEM  methodology,  all  unstandardized  factor  loadings,  error
variances[21]  and error  covariances were constrained to  be equal  between the groups to
reach comparability  of  the coefficients  of  the groups.[22]  Because all  variables  are nearly
normal  distributed (skewness <3 and kurtosis  <10,  see Kline 2011)  a maximum likelihood
estimator will  be used with software Mplus.[23] Table 3 shows the results of the described
structural equation model to test H1.1, H1.2, and H1.3.
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Table 3: Two-group structural equation model (H1.1 and H1.2)
Automatic-spontaneous mode
(resp. latency ≤ median; N = 557)
 b SE t
Structural effects on Attitude towards behavior (AttBeh):
acquiescence -.061** .021 -2.889
attitude towards target (AttTarget) .799** .111 7.218
belief 1 -.127** .032 -3.919
belief 2 -.018 .019 -.956
belief 3 -.023 .020 -1.151
belief 4 -.018 .019 -.988
Altruism .027 .038 .706
R2 .687
Measurement models:
AttBeh → Item AttBeh DA 1.000 - -
AttBeh → Item AttBeh CH 1.093** .075 14.598
AttTarget → Item AttTarget DA 1.000 - -
AttTarget → Item AttTarget CH 1.371** .130 10.572
Altruism → Item ALT 1.000 - -
Covariances of measurement errors:
AttBeh-DA ↔ AttTarget-DA .234** .024 9.708
AttBeh-CH ↔ AttTarget-CH .167** .027 6.298
Deliberative-controlled mode
(resp. latency > median; N = 557)
 b SE t
Structural effects on Attitude towards behavior (AttBeh):
acquiescence -.025 .022 -1.123
attitude towards target (AttTarget) .530** .108 4.883
belief 1 -.076* .030 -2.545
belief 2 -.014 .022 -.642
belief 3 -.043* .020 -2.203
belief 4 -.052* .021 -2.525
Altruism .069+ .035 1.952
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R2 .478
Measurement models:
AttBeh  → Item AttBeh DA 1.000 - -
AttBeh → Item AttBeh CH 1.093** .075 14.598
AttTarget → Item AttTarget DA 1.000 - -
AttTarget → Item AttTarget CH 1.371** .130 10.572
Altruism → Item ALT 1.000 - -
Covariances of measurement errors:
AttBeh-DA ↔ AttTarget-DA .234** .024 9.708
AttBeh-CH ↔ AttTarget-CH .167** .027 6.298
Y = attitude towards donating money for charity organizations (AttBeh); DA = development aid;
CH = charity; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05; + p ≤ 0.10; without marker: n.s. with p > 0.10
Overall fit:  = 39.054; df = 28; p = 0.080; CFI = 0.993; RMSEA = 0.027 (CI0.90: 0.000 to
0.045); SRMR = 0.020
The goodness of fit of the model is good (see Table 3). The results reported in Table 3 show
supporting evidence for H1.1 and H1.2: Acquiescence is only a significant predictor in the case
of spontaneous processing ( -difference of 8.072, df=1, p=0.004). Additionally, the effect of
generalized attitude towards target  is  significant  stronger  in  spontaneous mode group (
-difference of 3.914, df=1, p=0.048).[24]
Further, the reported results show evidence for usage of response latency as an indicator of
mode  of  information  processing  according  to  hypothesis  H1.3:  in  case  of  slow  response
latencies, three out of four beliefs significantly affect the behavioural attitude in contrast to only
one significant belief in the spontaneous mode. Thus, in line with hypothesis H1.3, slow (i.e.
more thoughtful) responders indeed consider a broader information basis in contrast to fast
responders.
Next,  the  presented  model  will  be  expanded  by  the  implementation  of  chronic  attitude
accessibility of the attitude towards the target.  By doing this,  it  is possible to estimate the
complete dual-process model  presented in Figure 2  and thus to test  hypothesis H2.1  and
H2.2. Table 4 reports the empirical results of this four-group structural equation model (two
response mode groups and two attitude accessibility groups).
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Table 4: Four-group structural equation model (H2.1 and H2.2)
Automatic-spontaneous mode
(resp. latency ≤ median; N = 557)
 
High attitude accessibility
(N = 244)
Low attitude accessibility
(N = 313)
b SE t b SE t
Structural effects on Attitude towards behavior (AttBeh):
acquiescence -.053 .034 -1.541 -.064* .027 -2.400
attitude towards target (AttTarget) .950** .157 6.057 .715** .149 4.787
belief 1 -.097* .042 -2.285 -.157** .047 -3.358
belief 2 .008 .028 .285 -.044 .027 -1.644
belief 3 -.026 .032 -.794 -.017 .025 -.701
belief 4 -.036 .026 -1.406 -.003 .027 -.120
Altruism -.077 .066 -1.169 .092+ .049 1.885
R2 .781 .706
Measurement models:
AttBeh → Item AttBeh-DA 1.000 - - 1.000 - -
AttBeh → Item AttBeh-CH 1.087** .075 14.534 1.087** .075 14.534
AttTarget → Item AttTarget-DA 1.000 - - 1.000 - -
AttTarget → Item AttTarget-CH 1.401** .130 10.765 1.401** .130 10.765
Altruismus → Item ALT 1.000 - - 1.000 - -
Covariances of measurement errors:
AttBeh-DA ↔ AttTarget-DA .233** .024 9.786 .233** .024 9.786
AttBeh-CH ↔ AttTarget-CH .155** .026 5.962 .155** .026 5.962
Deliberative-controlled mode
(resp. latency > median; N = 557)
 
High attitude accessibility
(N = 244)
Low attitude accessibility
(N = 313)
 b SE t b SE t
Structural effects on Attitude towards behavior (AttBeh):
acquiescence -.052 .035 -1.487 -.003 .031 -.094
attitude towards target (AttTarget) .464* .192 2.421 .568** .130 4.378
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belief 1 -.062 .046 -1.361 -.089* .039 -2.302
belief 2 -.025 .032 -.794 -.011 .030 -.370
belief 3 -.047 .029 -1.645 -.037 .026 -1.393
belief 4 -.021 .028 -.747 -.074* .031 -2.402
Altruism .017 .048 .357 .099+ .053 1.855
R2 .432   .452
Measurement models:
AttBeh → Item AttBeh-DA 1.000 - - 1.000 - -
AttBeh → Item AttBeh-CH 1.087** .075 14.534 1.087** .075 14.534
AttTarget → Item AttTarget-DA 1.000 - - 1.000 - -
AttTarget → Item AttTarget-CH 1.401** .130 10.765 1.401** .130 10.765
Altruismus → Item ALT 1.000 - - 1.000 - -
Covariances of measurement errors:
AttBeh-DA ↔ AttTarget-DA .233** .024 9.786 .233** .024 9.786
AttBeh-CH ↔ AttTarget-CH .155** .026 5.962 .155** .026 5.962
Y = attitude towards donating money for charity organizations (AttBeh); DA = development aid;
CH = charity; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05; + p ≤ 0.10; without marker: n.s. with p > 0.10
Overall fit: = 104.836; df = 67; p = 0.002; CFI = 0.975; RMSEA = 0.045 (CI0.90: 0.027 to
0.061); SRMR = 0.034
Again, the goodness of fit  values support the estimated model. In correspondence with the
dual-process model and H2.1, acquiescence does in fact have only a significant effect under
the two proposed conditions: spontaneous mode and low chronic attitude accessibility (Table
4).  In the other three groups, the effect of acquiescence is weaker and non-significant (
-difference: 5.58; df=1; p=0.018).
According to the dual-process model and hypothesis H2.2, the effect of the attitude towards
the target is – as expected – significantly strongest in the group of spontaneous mode and
high accessibility ( -difference: 4.795; df=1; p=0.029).
In sum, the empirical model of basis of specific evaluative judgments in surveys shows that all
hypotheses  are  supported.  Thus,  acquiescence  and  attitude  effects  are  stronger  when
respondents answer fast respectively in automatic-spontaneous mode – and beliefs are more
predictive in case of deliberative response mode. And looking deeper into the mechanism that
is  responsible  for  these  effects  within  spontaneous  mode,  SEM analysis  showed that  (1)
acquiescence  occurs  only  under  conditions  of  automatic-spontaneous  processing  without
having a high chronic accessible attitude towards targets,  and (2)  that  attitude effects are
significant strongest in case of spontaneous processing with a high attitude accessibility. [25]
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Conclusions
In this paper, it was shown how response latencies can be measured in computer assisted
surveys and which data treatment steps are necessary. An important application of response
latencies  is  their  use  as  proxy  measure  of  response  mode,  i.e.  the  mode  of  information
processing  which  is  active  during  answering  to  survey  questions.  To  adopt  this  response
latency approach, a dual-process model of response behaviour was proposed to explain the
predictive  power  of  attitudes  and  the  occurrence  and  strength  of  response  effects  (here:
acquiescence bias).
Empirical  analyses  using  CATI  data  to  explain  response  behaviour  in  surveys  showed
evidence in favor of the hypotheses assuming stronger generalized attitudinal effects and the
occurrence of acquiescence bias in case of automatic-spontaneous response mode (i.e. fast
latencies) in contrast to deliberative-controlled responses (i.e. slow latencies). Additionally, it
was shown that responders indeed use to a broader information basis (i.e. use of more beliefs)
when answering in a deliberative-controlled way (i.e. slow latencies). In an expanded model, it
was expected that  spontaneous response effects  and attitudinal  effects  are moderated by
chronic accessibility of attitudes within the automatic-spontaneous response mode. Empirically,
indeed chronic attitude accessibility did moderate effects of acquiescence bias and attitudes in
spontaneous mode only. Thus, as assumed by the dual-process model, attitude accessibility is
irrelevant for the impact of attitudes and response effects on response behaviour in the case of
deliberative processes. On the other hand, as theoretically expected, spontaneous response
effects (here: acquiescence bias) are strongest in the case of low attitude accessibility, and
attitudes are most predictive towards information processing in case of spontaneous mode
with high attitude accessibility.
As  theoretically  argued,  certain  response  effects  are  more  likely  to  appear  if  response
latencies  are  short  (e.g.  acquiescence,  assimilation  effects  of  question  order)  and  other
response effects are more likely in the case of long response latencies (e.g. contrast effects of
question order). This casts doubt on the interpretation of slow response latency as an indicator
of  non-attitudes (Fazio,  1990a,  1990b).  Instead,  response effects have to be differentiated
theoretically in terms whether they are expected to need more or less mental effort (see Mayerl
& Urban, 2008 for an empirical application of response latencies on question order effects).
The presented analysis points out the usefulness of measuring response latencies in CATI
surveys to apply dual-process models for a better understanding and explanation of response
effects and predictive power of attitudes. Response latencies can be easily applied and should
become a standard in all computer assisted surveys.
[1]  A lot  of  studies use response latencies as a measure of  chronic accessibility  of  social
judgments like attitudes (e.g. Fazio, 1986), intentions (e.g. Bassili, 1995), beliefs (e.g. Ajzen,
Nichols, & Driver, 1995), or social values (e.g. Dehue, McClintock, & Liebrand, 1993). In the
case  of  all  these  applications,  the  central  assumption  is  that  the  stronger  the  mental
association between an object and its evaluation, the faster will this evaluation be processed
and articulated. Important predictors of chronic accessibility are the frequency of elicitation and
direct experience with the object (Fazio, 1986, 1990a; Fazio et al., 1982). The interpretation of
response latency as an indicator of cognitive accessibility is consistent with the use as an
indicator of elaboration, since high accessible judgments are mainly dominant in spontaneous
mode, see Theoretical background.
[2]  In  case  of  non-linearity,  the  residuals  can  be  computed  by  splitting  the  regression
estimation in several subgroup analyses, e.g. by tertile split.
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[3] All correlations between raw latencies and baseline speed measures are highly significant
(p<0.05) with Pearson’s r about r = 0.25 (little variation due to different target latencies; see
Mayerl et al., 2005 and Mayerl & Urban, 2008). In contrary, the correlation of Residual Index
and baseline speed is always non-significant (p>0.1).
[4] The use of simple factual items to gain a basal physical-motoric baseline speed avoids that
other important characteristics of respondents are controlled for too (e.g. level of education).
This  would  be  the  case  when  applying  a  measure  of  “cognitive  demanding  information
processing speed” (Mayerl et al., 2005, p. 3) as baseline speed. See Mayerl et al., 2005 and
Mayerl & Urban, 2008 for a comparison of different baseline speed measures.
[5]  In  the  presented  dual-process  model,  motivation  and  opportunity  are  multidimensional
constructs, see Mayerl 2009 for a detailed discussion.
[6] This is the case because of the fact that deliberative processes base on the calculation of
raw data in a bottom-up way instead of the top-down processing in the spontaneous mode.
Thus, low chronic accessible attitudes (or other overall-evaluative mental constructs) can be
retrieved or generated in the deliberative mode and it is irrelevant for the result of deliberative
processing whether the attitude was high or low chronically accessible at the beginning of the
cognitive process.
[7] Chronic accessibility of mental objects (e.g. attitudes) can be defined as the „[…] readiness
to be used in information processing […]“ (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 131) and „[…] the ease
with  which  information  is  retrieved.“  (Shrum  &  O’Guinn,  1993,  p.  440).  Thus,  the  higher
accessible an attitude, the higher the probability of its automatic activation: “According to the
model, the likelihood of activation of the attitude upon mere observation of the attitude object
depends on the chronic accessibility of the attitude.” (Fazio, 1990a, p. 81).
[8]  The  population  was  defined  as  follows:  German  speaking  resident  population  with
telephone connection and an age of 18 years and older.
[9] According to the AAPOR Standard Definitions, the response rate is RR1=0.11. Using an
alternative  definition  of  net  response  rate  as  the  proportion  of  completed  interviews  and
successfully contacted households (excluding neutral non-response), this net response rate is
28.4%.
[10] This assumption holds true for a lot of expressive cases of negation, especially in a logical
sense, but clearly sometimes the subjective meaning of a negated expression is not perceived
as the exact opposite. In this application, we assume that respondents perceive “I do not like
XYZ” as the mirror of “I like XYZ”, basing on the fact that all respondents share experiences in
everyday life to “like” or “not like” a lot of things and events. So we think that respondents are
both experienced with expressing the negative and the positive forms of judgment we test in
our split ballot experiment and that people treat these as clear opposites.
[11] A possible effect of different questionnaire versions was controlled in two ways: firstly, all
used variables in this model were not varied concerning their question order or wording. And
secondly, all analyses were rerun with dummy control variables of questionnaire version. As a
result, the questionnaire variations don’t have any influence on the reported results.
[12] The exact wording of the two items (own translation) (1: agree…5: disagree): “I think it is
very positive if I donate money to charity organizations“; “I think it is very positive to donate
money to organizations undertaking development aid”.
[13] See Ajzen & Fishbein (1980, p. 79ff), Eagly & Chaiken (1993, p. 163f), Fazio (1990a) and
Mayerl (2009) for a detailed discussion of the difference between attitudes towards targets
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(sometimes misleading called attitudes towards objects) and more specific attitudes towards
behavior.
[14] The exact wording of the two items (own translation) (1: very good…5: very bad): “How do
you like charity organizations?”; “How do you like organizations undertaking development aid?“
[15] Due to a better interpretation, the scale of the beliefs was divided by 10. Substantially, the
four beliefs are: “help people”, “clear conscience”, “money usage” and “religious belief”. The
evaluative dimension of modelling beliefs according to Theory of Reasoned Action (based on
expectancy-value  theory)  was  measured  by  (own  translation;  1:  very  important…5:  very
unimportant; scaling was reversed before multiplying with expectancies): “How important is it
to you to help other people?”;  “How important is it to you to always have a clear conscience?”;
“How important is it to you to that you can be absolutely sure that the money will be used in a
way  it  was  intended  to?”;   “How  important  are  religious  beliefs  to  you?”;  The  according
expectancies were measured with following items (percentage scale 0-100%): “What do you
think, how probable is it that donating money helps other people?”; “How probable is it that
donating money gives you a better clear conscience?”; “How probable is it that donated money
will  be  used  in  a  way  it  was  intended  to?”;  “How  probable  is  it  that  donating  money
corresponds to your religious beliefs?”
[16] In literature numerous ways to measure tendency to acquiescence as a response style
are proposed (e.g. Billiet  & McClendon, 2000; Kieruj  & Moors,  2010; Narayan & Krosnick,
1996;  Smith,  2004;  Van  Herk,  Poortinga,  &  Verhallen,  2004;  Watson,  1992).  In  SEM
framework, one possibility is to model response style as a latent method factor in addition to
substantive  latent  constructs  as  it  is  specified  in  SEM multitrait-multimethod  models  (e.g.
Brown, 2006; Eid, 2000). Billiet & McClendon (2000, p. 623f) validate their latent acquiescence
construct  with a different and more classical  way of  operationalization of  acquiescence by
computing  an  acquiescence  score  variable.  Both  ways  of  measuring  acquiescence  highly
correlate  with  r=0.9,  indicating  high  correspondence.  In  our  case,  due  to  lack  of  enough
balanced sets of items, we compute acquiescence score by adding amount of “completely
agree” (rating “1”) to exact 100 items with 5-point rating scales during the survey on multiple
contents. These items are about attitudes and perceived norms on health-conscious nutrition,
environmental concern, religion, attitude towards surveys, and different psychological scales.
Such a measure of acquiescence without balanced items has already been tested and shown
to be a valid measure of  acquiescence (Watson, 1992).  The assumption is that  the score
measures “[...] a tendency to strongly agree with survey statements irrespective of content.”
(Watson, 1992, p. 66). Thus, using a wide range of items with completely different contents, it
allows us to compute a content-independent index score of tendency to acquiescence. To test
whether our acquiescence score index indeed is independent of item content, correlations of
acquiescence with behavioral intentions (percentage scale) to donate money (5 items) and to
eat in a health-conscious way (6 items) were estimated. Results show that acquiescence score
and behavioral intentions correlate independent of content (donation intentions: r between 0.09
and 0.13; health-conscious nutrition: r between 0.05 and 0.16; all correlations p<0.05).
[17]  Wording of  the item of  altruism (own translation)  (1:  agree…5: disagree):  “Everybody
should spend some time on the welfare of his city or community”.
[18]  To test  the external  validity  of  this  measure of  direct  experience and thus of  chronic
accessibility,  the  correlation  of  membership  and  yearly  frequency  of  donating  money  was
checked. This correlation was highly significant (p ≤ 0.01) in expected direction on a moderate
level (r = 0.25 (N = 1081)).
[19]  The measurement  error  variance of  the  one-indicator  latent  construct  control  variable
“altruism” is fixed to “(1-Reliability)*Variance(Item)” (see Bollen, 1989, p. 168) with assumed
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reliability of 0.8. The results are stable when re-estimating the model with different reliability
assumptions  (0.7;  1.0).  In  addition,  all  results  remain  the  same  when  re-estimating  the
complete model with acquiescence as latent one-indicator construct  with different reliability
assumptions.
[20] The criterion variables were “frequency of going to church” and “sum of donated money in
the last 12 months (Euro, taken the logarithm)”. All correlations were highly significant (p ≤
0.01) on a moderate level with r = 0.14 to r = 0.39.
[21]  Except  the  error  variances  of  the  construct  “attitude  towards  behavior”  which  were
significantly  different  between  the  response  mode  groups,  thus  leading  to  partial  error
invariance. Reanalyzing all models without this partial error invariance showed that all reported
results are stable and therefore independent of this invariance assumption.
[22]  The error correlations are necessary due to the substantive nearness of  both attitude
constructs.  But the correlations are not high (r  = 0.17 and r  = 0.32; all  p ≤  0.01),  so that
discriminant  validity  of  both  constructs  is  still  given.  Additionally,  error  covariances  are
constrained to be equal across groups so that differences between groups are not affected by
possibly different error covariances.
[23] Additionally, the model was re-estimated with variance and mean robust ML (MLMV) and
categorical WLSMV estimation. The results of the tests of the hypotheses are stable and thus
independent of distribution of indicators and applied estimators (see Mayerl, 2009, p. 285ff for
more details).
[24] All -difference tests to compare effects between groups are applied by testing a model
with  equality  constraints  (equal  effects  between  groups)  against  a  model  with  freeing  the
relevant parameter.
[25]  Interestingly,  effects  of  beliefs  seem  to  be  moderated  by  attitude  accessibility  within
deliberative mode in  four-group model  (Table 4)  (we had no hypothesis  on moderation of
effects of beliefs within deliberative mode). According to this result, beliefs are more predictive
when attitude accessibility is low. But more important and in line with dual-process model of
response  behavior,  attitude  accessibility  does  not  moderate  attitude  effects  in  deliberative
mode.  Future research is  needed on moderation of  belief  effects  within deliberative mode
processing and a possible role of attitude accessibility.
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